Al-Shabaab’s 30-Day Offensive: Feb-Mar 2025 and Government Counteroffensive
Mustafa Osman Farah1
In February and March 2025, Al-Shabaab, the militant group in Somalia, increased its attacks. These months were a crucial time for their fight against the Somali government and international forces. Al-Shabaab aimed to regain territory and challenge government control. They used ground assaults, strategic attacks, and new tactics to show their strength.
On February 18, 2025, Al-Shabaab commanders, including Ahmed Diriye (a.k.a. Abu Ubaidah) the current emir of Al-Shabaab gathered at their Political Office, this meeting was believed they successfully discussed military tactics and internal clan power struggles which had jeopardized their unity. This meeting was a response to both military setbacks and internal clan rivalries that had begun to threaten their cohesion. The killing of Mohamed Mire, a top commander, in a U.S. airstrike left a leadership vacuum. Al-Shabaab’s response to this was quick; a new Interior Minister was promptly appointed, whose name cannot be disclosed. According to a report published in March by Gaashaan Dialogue, debriefings of defectors corroborate their findings of the increasing factionalism and distrust among the group’s leadership. Such divisions are heavily connected to persistent counterterrorism pressures delivered by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and international actors.
In January, the clans in Hiraan began operations against Al-Shabaab, hoping to drive the group out of their lands. To strengthen this effort, the government sent its intelligence chief to bring the clans together and help coordinate their actions. But Al-Shabaab responded by increasing its attacks, aiming to break any possibility of a united front against them. Meanwhile, in Middle Shabelle, the clans were not in agreement with each other, and this division gave Al-Shabaab the opportunity to infiltrate the region with less resistance. The lack of unity among the clans weakened their ability to effectively combat the extremist group.
Intelligence sources indicate that Al-Shabaab invested $25 million to bribe clan leaders. This strategy aimed to create divisions among militias and infiltrate important networks. By keeping local fighters divided, Al-Shabaab effectively prevented a unified resistance, allowing them a clear path to advance. Clan militias, once part of Operation Black Lion in Middle Shabelle, are now disorganized. This fragmentation has favored Al-Shabaab, as they now confront smaller, weaker groups.
By February 20, 2025, Al-Shabaab launched a series of well-coordinated attacks on strategic towns in Middle Shabelle, including Ceel Cali and Cali Fooldheere—areas that were once thought to be beyond their reach. This rapid advance marked a significant shift in their military strategy. They swiftly captured towns like Miirtaqwa and Boos-Caamir, extending their territorial control. The Somali government’s response was slow, and their inability to hold these areas revealed the fragmentation and weakening of local militias. Al-Shabaab’s ability to exploit these gaps demonstrated the deep divisions within Somali forces, which struggled to counter the group’s advances effectively
On February 22, the group targeted Cadaan-Laxeey, a strategic location near Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct successful attacks so close to the capital raised alarms about their reach and capabilities. As they pushed forward, the militants continued to execute IED explosions in Mogadishu’s Hodan district, targeting both civilian and military structures. This was part of Al-Shabaab’s broader strategy to destabilize government control in urban areas.
Al-Shabaab’s capture of Afarta Tuulo (Ceelbaraf, Caadley, Miirtaqwa, and Biyocadde) immediately followed the withdrawal government forces, taking advantage of the security vacuum to consolidate its presence in Middle Shabelle. This corridor is key to the group’s operational mobility allowing it to move fighters and weapons, and launching attacks into government-held areas. Apart from its military utility, Afarta Tuulo serves as an economic and administrative center where Al-Shabaab imposes taxes, recruits fighters and consolidates its governance. The speed of this area’s occupation reflects a broader challenge in Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts: the group has turned a weak state presence to its advantage, carving out new territory, spreading its influence and destabilizing the region.
By February 27, the group’s offensive had expanded beyond just rural regions. In a shocking maneuver, they assaulted Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport shortly after Ethiopian Airlines’ flight transporting Prime Minister Abiy touched down on the runway that Thursday midday. Simultaneously, a heavy militant presence swarmed the outskirts of Mogadishu as civilians using the road reported. These coordinated attacks demonstrated Al-Shabaab was not only focusing on military bases but also seeking to sabotage key infrastructure critical to the Somali government’s functioning.
As March 2025 unfolded, Al-Shabaab’s attacks became even more frequent and intense. On March 3, the group launched a direct assault on Ceel Cali, forcing Somali forces into a prolonged battle. This was one of several key locations where Al-Shabaab managed to establish strongholds, complicating Somali military efforts to regain control.
On March 4, Somali forces attempted to respond. They deployed drones to target Al-Shabaab positions, especially in the Al-Kowthar region. But the group’s ability to withstand aerial attacks and maintain control over key regions underscored their growing resilience and tactical sophistication. The use of drones by the Somali forces demonstrated a shift towards more advanced military operations, but Al-Shabaab’s ability to hold onto the territory indicated their increasing strength on the ground.
On March 5, Al-Shabaab seized War-Ciise, a key town just 25 kilometers from Jowhar. The capture of War-Ciise allowed the group to expand its influence even further into regions that had been considered secure for the Somali government. This rapid expansion made it harder for government forces to organize a counteroffensive.
On March 9, a significant ambush occurred. The administrator of Ceel-Caadle was killed, along with his guards. This attack, aimed at undermining local governance, was another sign of Al-Shabaab’s strategy to destabilize government control in both urban and rural areas. Shortly after, Somali forces destroyed a bridge in the Middle Shabelle region, attempting to slow Al-Shabaab’s advance. Despite these efforts, the militants continued to push forward, indicating their growing operational depth.
One of the most concerning developments in March 2025 was Al-Shabaab’s increasing use of technology to counter Somali forces. On March 10, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for shooting down five drones in Al-Kowthar. This marked a significant shift in their tactics, as the group had previously relied on conventional methods of warfare. Their ability to shoot down drones indicated a growing sophistication in their operations, as they adapted to the Somali government’s aerial strategies.
This change in tactics suggested that Al-Shabaab was not only focused on conventional ground warfare but was also developing countermeasures to limit the effectiveness of Somali military airstrikes. By enhancing their anti-aircraft capabilities, Al-Shabaab had taken a significant step toward neutralizing one of the government’s most effective military advantages.
Several factors are driving al-Shabaab’s recent offensive. With local elections scheduled for June 2025, the Somali government has shifted its focus to increasing influence in electoral zones, especially in Middle Shabelle. Al-Shabaab is responding by destabilizing these areas to weaken the election process and undermine the government’s authority.
Throughout March, Al-Shabaab continued its campaign of targeting civilians and critical infrastructure. On March 11, the group carried out an attack on a hotel in Beledweyne, killing several civilians and traditional elders. These elders were vital in local governance, and their deaths further destabilized the already fragile regions under Somali government control. Such attacks are part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy to create fear, disrupt governance, and undermine social stability.
In parallel with these assaults, Al-Shabaab also intensified attacks on Somali forces. By March 15, the militants had captured Sumadaale, a town near Adale, further isolating Somali forces and making it harder for them to regroup. The fall of these towns showed how much territory Al-Shabaab had gained in just a few weeks.
The Somali government faced an increasingly difficult situation in February and March 2025. As Al-Shabaab expanded its influence, the government struggled to regain control over the areas lost to the militants. The Somali forces launched several counterattacks, but the group’s ability to hold territory and respond to these operations highlighted the challenges the government was facing.
The government responded with airstrikes, but these were often ineffective against Al-Shabaab’s growing military capabilities. On March 18, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was targeted in an assassination attempt. A bomb was placed under his convoy, but he survived the attack. This incident underscored the deep threat posed by Al-Shabaab, not only to local governments but to the nation’s leadership itself.
On the morning of March 19, government forces and their allied militias withdrew from the Guullane direction, allowing Al-Shabaab to lift the siege on their units in the central regions. This withdrawal enabled the reunification of Al-Shabaab’s forces. Al-Shabaab entered Guulane early on March 20, marking another significant territorial gain for the group.
That same night, a major counterterrorism operation was led by the Danab special mission unit, following crucial intelligence. The target was a high-value Al-Shabaab meeting in Suumadaale, a village located about 15 kilometers from Miirtaqwa.While initial reports suggested that Bayraktar Akıncı drones were involved in the operation, it has since been clarified that the drones were not used. Having only arrived in the country two days ago.
The Danab forces successfully raided the meeting and targeted key members of the Al-Shabaab leadership. This operation underscores the ongoing efforts of Somalia’s security forces to disrupt militant activities, with the Danab special mission unit continuing to play a vital role in the fight against terrorism.
On March 20 afternoon, armed militiamen from Al-Shabaab were observed on the main road connecting Mogadishu and Afgoye. These militants carried out a brief operation in the Lafoole area, located on the outskirts of Mogadishu, halting individuals and vehicles utilizing the road. The presence of Al-Shabaab militants in such proximity to the capital raised significant concerns about the security situation and the group’s ability to exert control over vital transportation routes.
International Response and the Role of the UAE and Turkey
Recognizing the escalating crisis, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made a direct appeal to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 10, seeking military assistance and financial support. Additionally, Turkey’s supply of advanced drones has played a pivotal role in countering Al-Shabaab’s rural operations, though their effectiveness remains limited in urban environments.
With Somalia’s arms embargo lifted, the government has more flexibility in acquiring sophisticated weaponry. However, unless there is a robust strategy to counter Al-Shabaab’s growing technological expertise, these gains could be offset by the militant group’s rapid adaptation.
What Lies Ahead?
Al-Shabaab’s offensive from February to March 2025 has underscored a fundamental shift in Somalia’s security landscape. The group is not only maintaining its traditional guerrilla tactics but also investing heavily in political manipulation, financial infiltration, and technological warfare.
While Somali forces have managed to launch counteroffensives, the ability of Al-Shabaab to rapidly recover and maintain its operational capacity suggests that a prolonged and evolving conflict is inevitable. The next few months will be critical in determining whether the Somali government and its international partners can regain control or whether Al-Shabaab will continue to expand its influence across Somalia.
One thing is clear: the battle is no longer just about territorial control it is about who can adapt faster in an increasingly complex war.
- Mustafa Osman Farah is a researcher based in Somalia focused on terrorism and counter-terrorism, with an emphasis on monitoring security incidents and extremist activity across the region. ↩︎
