The question “Why Somaliland, and why now?” is not merely about Israel’s foreign policy choice; it is about a broader transformation in how power, sovereignty, and recognition are exercised in today’s international system. The move reflects less departure from established practice than a convergence of strategic opportunity and normative erosion.
At its core, Israel’s engagement with Somaliland is driven by security calculus rather than legal principle.
The Red Sea has become a high-risk maritime arena following repeated attacks on shipping and the widening regional confrontation linked to Huthi in Yemen. In this environment, access, proximity, and reliability outweigh formal diplomatic alignments. Somaliland offers a stable coastline, a cooperative authority, and geographic proximity to emerging threats. From a strategic standpoint, the decision answers a practical question: who can provide usable security partnerships now? In Israel’s assessment, the answer lies not with the internationally recognized center that may not accept aligning with their sinister plans, but with a peripheral authority capable of delivering immediate operational value.
The logic implies that functionality now precedes legality, marking a departure from the post-1945 hierarchy of sovereignty. Precedents such as Kosovo and the transactional diplomacy of the late 2010s normalized the idea that recognition can be selective, conditional, and strategically traded. Somaliland fits within this trajectory. The novelty lies less in Israel’s behavior than in the absence of effective constraints against it.
The timing also exposes Somalia’s structural vulnerability. Decades of limited territorial control, fragmented authority, and constrained maritime governance have produced what can be described as a sovereignty gap. External actors do not create this gap; they exploit it. When a state cannot perform core functions, security, coordination, or reliable partnership, it invites alternatives. In this sense, Somaliland’s elevation is a symptom of Somalia’s prolonged fragility, not its cause. Yet once legitimized, symptoms can reshape the system itself.
This raises a critical concern about precedent. If recognition follows functionality, why should other federal entities refrain from pursuing the same path? The logic implicitly rewards sub-state actors that can offer strategic services to external powers. Over time, these risks transforming federalism from a framework of shared sovereignty into a ladder toward incremental fragmentation.
There is also a regional cost. Security arrangements built on transactional partnerships may yield short-term advantages, but they tend to undermine long-term stability. Fragmented political spaces are more easily penetrated, contested, and instrumentalized. What appears efficient today may generate instability tomorrow, as competing actors seek to sponsor their own “useful” authorities.
The Somaliland case signals a world where raw power has outpaced the law. When recognition is treated as a reward for being “useful” rather than a legal right, it triggers a dangerous Competitive Federalism.
In this climate, other regions may decide that loyalty to the national constitution is less profitable than selling their strategic services to foreign powers. This risks dissolving the Somali state into a collection of unstable, fragmented footprints rather than a unified nation.
Ultimately, a government that cannot secure its own borders—the Sovereignty Gap—will find its legal rights ignored by the world. But there is a warning for the smaller partner too: being a “strategic tool” is a fragile substitute for real security. In a transactional world, the smallest players are the first to be discarded once their utility expires. Unless sovereignty is restored to its operational substance, it will continue to be redefined by outsiders at Somalia’s expense.
Salim Said Salim
Legal Expert
